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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
Case No. 20000720-CA

vs.
DEBRA LARECE ARANDA
Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2
:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from convictions on one count of aggravated burglary, a
first degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-203 (1999); two counts
of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-6-302 (1999), and one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance,
a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1999), in
the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable J. Dennis
Frederick presiding.1

defendant was also convicted on a misdemeanor count of unlawful possession of
a controlled substance. R. 280-281. Whether intentionally or inadvertently, appellant's
brief does not include an appeal of her conviction on that count. See Br. Aplt. at 1.

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(j)
(1996).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of the violent
propensities and criminal histories of two non-witness co-perpetrators where
defendant presented no evidence that they compelled her to commit aggravated
burglary and aggravated robbery?
Review of evidentiary rulings is usually for abuse of discretion. See State v.
Eberwein, 2001 UT App 71, 1fl[ 9, 11, 21 P.3d 1139. Defendant, however, has the
burden of presenting some evidence of an affirmative defense, in this case
compulsion. See State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 82 n.7 (Utah 1982). In other words,
defendant has "the burden of producing some evidence of the defense" where "no
evidence in the prosecution's case provides an evidentiary foundation for [the]
claim." State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211, 215 (Utah 1985) (self-defense); see also State
v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, % 8, 18 P.3d 1123 (self-defense). Whether defendant
has met that burden is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. See Knoll, 111
P.2dat215.
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it denied defendant's request
for a two-hour continuance to find her witness, who had been turned away from the
courthouse because he was so intoxicated that he could barely walk?

2

Review of a trial court's decision to grant or deny a continuance is for an
abuse of discretion. See Seel v. Van der Veur, 971 P.2d 924, 926 (Utah 1998); State
v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982). Error is reversible only if
"sufficiently prejudicial that there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
result for the defendant in its absence." Seel, 971 P.2d at 926 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are
reproduced in Addendum A:
§ 76-2-302 (1999)

UTAH CODE ANN.

Utah R. Evid. 404
Utah R. Evid. 405
Utah R. Evid. 801
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with one count of aggravated burglary,
two counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated kidnapping, and two
counts of unlawful possession of a controlled substance. R. 17-21. Defendant
admitted participation in the incident underlying the aggravated counts, but claimed
compulsion. R. 359:49-52; 360:41-44. Following a jury trial, defendant was
convicted on all but the kidnapping counts. R. 280-281, 291-297. Defendant's
motion for a new trial was subsequently denied, and she timely appealed. R. 308,
325, 328.
3

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Crime
Honorio Garcia was on his way to work on May 22, 1999. R. 359:56. His
wife, Norma Rosales, and their three small children were asleep in their West
Valley home. Id. at 101, 109. About 8:00 a.m. someone knocked on their door.
Honorio opened the door and saw two strangers—defendant and a male. Speaking
English, they asked for someone who did not live at the home. Honorio, whose
English skills were limited, did not fully understand them. Id. at 56-58.
The male then indicated that he urgently needed to use the bathroom, and both
visitors entered the home. Id. at 59-60. The male went into the bathroom. Id. at
60. Meanwhile, defendant pulled a baggy from her purse, indicating her belief that
drugs were available at the home. Id. At that moment, the male exited the
bathroom with a 12 to 14 inch knife, put the knive to Honorio's neck, and told him
not to move. Id. at 60-61.
A second male then entered the home and grabbed a kitchen knife.2 Id. at 6162. The three visitors asked for money. Id. at 63. The males asked defendant for
tape, and defendant took duct tape from her purse and gave it to them. Id. at 63-64,
151.
2

Defendant identified the two males as John Hender and Greg Myers. Myers was
probably the first male and Hender the second. Inconsistencies between the two versions
of the crime make it difficult to identify with certainty which male was Hender and which
was Myers.
4

One of the males held a knife to Honorio's throat while the other began taping
him. Id. at 65-66. Meanwhile, defendant entered the bedroom where Norma was
sleeping, awakened her, and asked for money. Id. at 66. Norma, who spoke little
English, did not understand. Id. at 103. Defendant made a gesture with her right
hand, snapping her fingers, and repeatedly asked for "[m]oney, money." Id.
Norma recognized defendant. She had seen her on four or five occasions
when defendant had sold used clothing at the apartment complex where Honorio
and Norma lived before moving to this home. Id. at 109-111.
Defendant told Norma to go out into the living room where the males were
binding Honorio. The males then bound Norma with tape. Id. at 67-68.
Meanwhile, defendant ransacked and searched the bedroom. Id. at 68.
During the ten to twenty minute episode, defendant found and took gold jewelry
valued at approximately $13,000, about $2400 in cash, and Honorio's watch,
apparently putting many of the items in her purse. Id. at 70, 113-116. Meanwhile,
the males were urging her to hurry. Id. at 69. One of the males also asked
defendant for her phone number. Id. at 70. Honorio, who understood numbers in
English, memorized it. Id.
Before leaving, the robbers cut the telephone cords. Id. at 71. On her way
out, defendant dropped a hundred-dollar bill. Id. at 114. One of the males took the

5

keys to the victims' two vehicles. Id. at 113. Honorio observed defendant and the
male trying to break into his truck. Id. at 73.
After they left, Honorio quickly extricated himself from the duct tape and
called the police on his cellular phone. Id. at 73-74. He gave the police the
telephone number he had memorized. Id. at 76.
The police traced the number to a Salt Lake City residence where they
apprehended defendant later that day. Id. at 153-156. Honorio, who accompanied
the police, identified her as the female robber. Id. at 157.
Defendant was driving a vehicle she had purchased that morning for $750.3
When police asked where she had been that morning, she said she had not been
anywhere that morning, but had left about an hour and a half before. Id. at 159.
The police arrested her. Id. at 160.
In a search incident to the arrest, Officer Paula Lozano found $392 in cash
and three rings in defendant's pocket. Id. at 160-161. Defendant stated that the
rings belonged to her children but that she carried them with her, now that her
children were adults. R. 360:15. Officer Lozano then asked defendant what her
children's names were. Defendant said she had a child named Jacob. Id. When the
officer noted the "H" initial on one of the rings, defendant changed her son's name
to Hajacob and then Hobo. Id.
3

Defendant said she paid $750. Police found a receipt for $600 and a bill of sale
for $750. R. 359:158; 360:12.
6

Honorio identified the rings as his. R. 359:78. The ring with an "H"
belonged to one of his children also named Honorio. Id. Honorio also identified as
his a watch and another ring found in defendant's purse. Id. at 171-172.
In the center compartment of defendant's purse, Officer Lozano found a
baggy with a white substance that field-tested positive for cocaine and another
baggy with a green leafy substance that field-tested positive for marijuana. R.
360:15-16.
At the police station, another officer observed a wad of money in defendant's
pants. Id. at 17-18. He called Officer Lozano, who could see the money in the
pocket she had already searched and emptied. Id. at 18. She asked defendant where
the money, $620 in $20 bills, came from. Id. at 18-19. Defendant stated that it had
been down her pants. Id. at 18.
Defendant was upset when Officer Lozano took the money from her.
Defendant stated that it was ironic that she was being accused of robbery in an
incident involving the robbery of a drug dealer. Id. at 18. She later repeated her
remark about the irony of the situation, telling Detective Nudd, "You must not want
the jewelry very bad, do you? I can take you right to it if you don't take me to jail."
R. 359:165.

7

Defendant's Version
Defendant testified that Honorio was a dope dealer from whom she had
regularly purchased drugs for about a year and a half. R. 360:38, 45. She testified
to the following version of the incident. Id. at 38-54.
Defendant bought drugs from Honorio for resale to John Hender. Because
she was planning to leave the state with her fiance, Terry Pierce, Honorio asked her
to bring Hender over. Honorio wanted to meet Hender because Hender was the one
"who [she] made money off." Id. at 38-39. Further, "John was bugging [her],"
apparently wanting to meet Honorio. Id. at 39.
She called Honorio early on the morning of the incident asking whether she
could bring Hender over. Id. Honorio agreed to the meeting. Id. Defendant
picked up Myers because she "like[d him] more" than she did Hender. Id. at 40.
When they got to Honorio's, defendant and Myers knocked on the door.
Hender was doing "something" in the car. Id. at 41. Defendant and Myers entered
the home. Defendant was explaining to Honorio that he could do business directly
with Hender when Hender came in and asked Honorio to show him "what kind of
drugs, what kind of business they would be doing." Id.
Honorio brought out three bags of dope. Id. Hender then asked for Honorio's
scales to make sure the drugs "weigh[ed] out." Id. Honorio "hem-haw[ed] around"
and said the battery in his scale was not working. Id. Hender became agitated, and
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Honorio tried to back out of any deal, saying he would not do business with Hender.
Hender then grabbed a knife from the dish drainer, seized Honorio, and said, "I
think you will." Id. at 42.
Defendant claimed she asked Hender what he was doing. Hender turned
around, went "like that" with the knife, and said, "You go find the rest of his drug
money and stereos and whatever." Id. at 43. Honorio was scared, and defendant
was scared for him. Id.
Defendant thought about running out the door, but she was the one that
"brought these people here." Id. So she went down the hall into the bedroom and
tried to explain to Norma, "They want money." Id. at 44. Norma did not
understand. Defendant "didn't want John to come up empty-handed" so she found
jewelry and stuffed it into her purse. Id. at 44.
She then left the bedroom, showed Hender and Myers the gold jewelry, and
encouraged them to get going. Id. at 45-46. She wanted to get them out before
anyone was hurt. Id. at 45.
After they left Honorio's home, defendant tried to walk away, but Hender told
her to get in the car. Id. at 46. The three of them then went to a motel. Defendant
"rant[ed] and ravfed] at them," asking, "Hell, what the hell did you do that for" and
"How dare you get me involved in this." Id. at 47. She claimed she then dumped
everything out of her purse and left. Id.

9

She said she was frantic and afraid the "Mexicans were going to shoot [her]."
Id. at 50. She had a thousand dollars "travel money" that had come from the sale of
her fiance's truck. Id. at 48.4 Because she was so frantic and because her car had
been impounded, she bought another car—the one she was using when
apprehended. Id. at 50-51. Even though it cost more to buy the new car than to get
her older car released from impoundment, she "didn't want to mess with getting the
other one out and wait until Monday and all that. [She] wanted to get gone." Id. at
51.
Defendant was apprehended with three rings in her pocket. She claimed they
must have fallen through to the bottom of her purse. When she was going through
her purse, she found them and thought she might be able to sell them if she needed
money, but she lied to the police about the rings because she felt so guilty. Id. at
51-53.5
Defendant concluded her testimony: "The way I felt about it was, here, I felt
like the wetbacks—Honorio and Norma—they didn't even know how lucky they
were probably that I was there . . . . And I felt like I had done good deed by getting
[Hender] out of there, even though I was the one that took him there." Id. at 53-54.

4

Officer Lozano testified that defendant said the money was her "tax money," not
her "truck" or "travel money." R. 359:15, 72.
5

Defendant never asserted that the watch had also fallen through to the bottom of
her purse. Instead, she stated that it belonged to her fiance. R. 359:68-70, 171-172.
10

Cross Examination
On cross examination, defendant denied that she had duct tape in her purse.
She said that she didn't know where the tape came from. Id. at 58. Later, however,
she said didn't "know why [duct tape] was in [her] purse," but that she had been
using it to pack. Id. at 64. When asked about Myers's pulling a knife, she stated
that she was surprised. Id. at 58. "And I looked at him like, Are you in on it, too?
Oh, Lord." Id.
Further, when asked on cross examination whether Hender was ever
threatening when he was pointing his knife toward her, defendant responded, "He
had Honorio by the shoulder and he had a knife. Then he said, You shut up and go
find the rest of the dope and the money." Id. at 60. When pressed and asked
specifically whether Hender had threatened her with harm if she did not go back
into the bedroom to find the dope and money, defendant answered, "He pointed the
knife, and I didn't want him to hurt Honorio or the kids." Id. Asked again whether
he said anything to her when he pointed the knife, defendant said, "He didn't have
to. I knew not to mess around just by instinct." Id. Asked whether she had heard
Hender or Myers threaten Honorio and Norma with their lives if they didn't comply,
defendant answered, "No, I didn't." Id. at 61.
Defendant further admitted that neither Hender nor Myers had any knowledge
of the jewelry in the home. Id. at 65. When asked whether she could have taken
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just the money, but not the jewelry, defendant said, "I figured that was more
impressive. [Hender] wanted to get dope and money. And I seen this and that
would be the ticket to get this man out of the house." Id.
Defendant said that she left all the jewelry with Hender and Myers. When
asked about the rings (apparently those found in her pant pocket) and the watch and
the other ring found in her purse, defendant said the rings were the ones that had
fallen into the bottom of her purse and the watch belonged to her fiance, Terry. Id.
at 68-69.
Defendant testified that Hender was "boisterous and "aggressive" and that
Myer was not trustworthy. R. 360:57. When asked why she would take "these
scary guys with her" to arrange for their direct purchase of drugs, defendant
answered, "Money is money, to them wetbacks and to me." Id. at 38, 57.
Evidentiary Rulings
First Memorialization for the Record
During a jury recess following the State's presentation of its case, the
prosecutor asked for an opportunity to place a matter on the record. He stated his
belief that defense counsel would "try to elicit through his witnesses, either the
defendant or [her former boyfriend, William Eaton], the criminal histories of the
two other suspects in this particular case." R. 360:26. He argued that such
testimony would be inadmissible under rules 608, 609, and 404, Utah Rules of
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Evidence. Id. Defense counsel responded that he would not be relying on rules
608, 609, and 404, but on rule 405(b). Id. at 28. The trial judge made no ruling,
stating that he would have to hear the matter in context. Id. at 29.
Cross Examination of Detective Kevin Nudd
Defendant attempted to introduce evidence concerning the criminal history
and character of her two co-perpetrators, John Hender and Greg Alan Myers.
During cross-examination of Detective Kevin Nudd, defense counsel asked whether
Hender and Myers "ha[d] numerous robberies." R. 359:169. The prosecutor then
asked for a side-bar conference and objected. See id.; R. 360:78. The trial judge
sustained his objection. See R. 360:78.
Direct Examination of William Jay Eaton
Defendant called her former boyfriend, William Jay Eaton, as a witness.
R. 360:30. Eaton testified that he was acquainted with Hender and Myers and
introduced them to defendant. R. 360:31-32. Defense counsel then asked Eaton
what he knew about them at that time and what he had told defendant about them.
R. 360:32. The State objected, and the court sustained the State's objections, ruling
that the testimony would be irrelevant and hearsay. Id. at 32-33. Defense counsel
protested that the testimony would go "directly to [his] defense." Id. at 32.
Defense counsel then asked Eaton whether defendant had given him "any
indication of what she thought of, whether she was afraid of John." Id. at 33. The
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witness stated that defendant did not like either Hender or Myers, but the witness
was cut short by a hearsay objection to testimony "as far as what was told to this
defendant or told to this witness by defendant." Id. Defense counsel protested,
arguing, "It's my client's statement." Id, The court sustained the prosecutor's
objection, ruling that the testimony would be hearsay. Id, at 33-34.
Second Memorialization for the Record
During a jury recess following the presentation of defendant's case, the trial
court permitted defense counsel to make a record of the proceedings relevant to the
excluded testimony. Defense counsel stated that his questions to Detective Nudd
were intended to elicit testimony that Hender had been imprisoned in two different
states and that Myers had been imprisoned in three different states for numerous
burglaries and robberies. R. 360:77.
The trial court responded that testimony regarding the prior bad acts of nonwitnesses would have tended to confuse the jury and would be "in large part
irrelevant." Id. at 78. "[F]or the reasons voiced by the State in our previous recess
incident to this matter, [the court] sustained the objections." Id.
Defense counsel again reiterated that he had relied on rule 405 because he
believed that Hender's and Myers's convictions were important to the defense. Id.

14

Request for Continuance and Motion for New Trial
Defendant planned to call her fiance, Terry Pierce, as one of her witnesses.
Pierce arrived at the courthouse on the day he was scheduled to testify, but security
staff stopped him at the entrance because he was obviously intoxicated. Id. at 37;
R. 325-326. He smelled of alcohol and was barely able to walk. Id. He was told to
leave the courthouse or he would be ticketed. Id. Court bailiffs then notified the
parties. Id.
The trial judge allowed defense counsel some time to go downstairs and
attempt to locate the witness. R. 326. Pierce was no longer in the area of the
courthouse. Id. Defense counsel then moved for a two hour continuance to attempt
to locate defendant. Id. The judge denied that request, and trial resumed. Id.
Defense counsel later placed on the record matters relevant to his continuance
request. R. 360:75. Defense counsel stated that Pierce would have testified that he
had purchased drugs from the victims in this case, that he knew how defendant
acted around Hender and Myers, that he knew something about their plans, and that
defendant had not helped plan the robbery. Id. at 76.
After the verdict, defense counsel moved for a new trial arguing that the trial
court's refusal to permit a continuance denied defendant his right to counsel and a
fair trial. R. 308. The judge denied the motion, stating that Pierce's condition
would have necessitated "more than a brief interruption of trial." R. 363:11. He
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further observed that, given Mr. Pierce's propensities, "one could not assume that he
would show up on any subsequent occasion in any condition to testify any more so
than he was the first time around." Id.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant admitted participating in the burglary and robbery, but alleged that
her participation was compelled. Defendant did not meet her burden to present an
evidentiary foundation for her claim and was therefore not entitled to a compulsion
defense.
Because she was not entitled to the defense, excluded testimony about her coperpetrators' violent characters and histories was irrelevant. Even with the excluded
testimony, defendant would not have carried her burden to produce some evidence
that she was compelled to participate by a specific threat. Further, viewing the facts
in a light most favorable to defendant, she was not entitled to the defense because
(a) she placed herself in a position where coercion was probable and (b) she
departed from the coercion, i.e., on her own initiative, she committed additional
criminal acts that were not coerced. The excluded testimony went, at most, to the
reasonableness of her failure to resist. Because she did not and could not establish
other essential elements of compulsion, the testimony was irrelevant.
The excluded testimony was also properly excluded as hearsay. The trial
judge properly ruled that the testimony was not admissible under Rule 405, Utah
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Rules of Evidence. While defendant argues other grounds for admission on appeal,
she did not argue them below and, in fact, affirmatively waived at least one of them.
Further, she does not argue "plain error" or any other exception to the preservation
rule, and these claims are not properly before this Court.
Even assuming that error occurred, it was harmless. Defendant was not
entitled to a compulsion defense. Further, the substance of the excluded testimony
was presented to the jury through other evidence adduced at trial. Finally, the
State's case against defendant was overwhelming while defendant's story was
riddled with inconsistencies. In the context of the case in its entirety, no reasonable
likelihood exists that absent the claimed errors the result would have been different.
Defendant's claim that the trial court improperly denied her request for a twohour continuance to locate her fiance-witness also fails. Defendant's witness had
arrived at the courthouse obviously intoxicated, and court security personnel had
turned him away. Defendant has not demonstrated that she could have found and
produced her witness in a condition to testify during the continuance requested or,
for that matter, during any reasonable time.
Further, defendant has not demonstrated that she was prejudiced by the denial
of her continuance request. Even with the witness's testimony, defendant would not
have been entitled to a compulsion defense. Further, the testimony the witness
might have presented was generally irrelevant and inadmissible. In any event, had a
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continuance been granted, had defendant produced her witness, had he been in a
condition to testify, and had he testified as proffered, no reasonable likelihood exists
of a different outcome. No prejudice ensued, and any error was harmless.
ARGUMENT
I.
DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESENT A REASONABLE BASIS
TO SUPPORT HER COMPULSION DEFENSE, AND THE
TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED TESTIMONY
OF HER CO-PERPETRATORS' VIOLENT PROPENSITIES
Defendant in this case admitted participating in the underlying criminal
activity, but alleged as an affirmative defense that her participation was compelled.
Br. Aplt. at 6-7. Defendant did not meet her burden to provide an evidentiary
foundation for her defense. See Knoll, 712 P.2d at 215. Therefore, as a matter of
law, she was not entitled to a compulsion defense.
Defendant claims that the trial court improperly excluded evidence of her coperpetrators' violent propensities and criminal histories. Br. Aplt. at 14.
Specifically, she claims that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding as
irrelevant and hearsay responses at the following junctures:
•

Detective Nudd was asked whether Hender and Myers "ha[d] numerous
robberies." R. 359:169.

•

William Eaton was asked what he knew about Hender at the time of the
incident. R. 360:32.
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•

Eaton was asked what he had told defendant about Hender and Myers. Id.

•

Eaton was asked whether defendant had given him any indication that she was
afraid of Hender. Id. at 33.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion. The trial court excluded the

testimony on two primary grounds: (a) relevance and (b) hearsay. The testimony
was irrelevant because defendant had presented no evidence of compulsion. At
most, the testimony she sought to adduce would have been relevant to the
reasonableness of her failure to resist coercion. Further, defendant demonstrated no
applicable exception to the hearsay rule.
A.

Because defendant presented no evidence on requisite elements of her
compulsion defense, the excluded evidence—pertinent only to the
reasonableness of her resistance—was irrelevant.

1.

Defendant did not establish a "specific threat"
Utah's compulsion defense statute, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-302 (1999)

states:
(1) A person is not guilty of an offense when he engaged in the proscribed
conduct because he was coerced to do so by the use or threatened imminent
use of unlawful physical force upon him or a third person, which force or
threatened force a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would not
have resisted.
(2) The defense of compulsion provided by this section shall be unavailable to
a person who intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly places himself in a
situation in which it is probable that he will be subjected to duress.
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To avail herself of a compulsion defense under the statute, a defendant must
present evidence that she was compelled to commit the offense by a threat of
violence that she could not reasonably have resisted. Case law interpreting this
statute makes clear that the threat cannot be "indefinite." State v. Harding, 635
P.2d 33, 35 (Utah 1981). Rather, testimony must establish the "specific detail of
[any] alleged threats" and "it must have been communicated to the defendant that
[s]he would be subjected to physical force presently." Id. Fear of danger, albeit
reasonable, is insufficient. See id. at 34-35 (no imminent threat of violence to
inmate, who had been involved in prison stabbing incident, and was afraid that
something might "happen"); see also State v. Ott, 763 P.2d 810, 812 (Utah App.
1988) (in theft context, "defendant must be faced with a specific, imminent threat of
death or serious bodily injury"); State v. Tuttle, 730 P.2d 630, 634 (Utah 1986) (in
escape context, threat must be specific and "must be at least that which would cause
substantial bodily injury").
In the instant case, defendant argues that her co-perpetrator(s) threatened the
immediate use of unlawful physical force against her and against the victims and
that she participated in the incident only because of that threat. The only evidence
defendant presented or attempted to present regarding this threat was her personal
testimony.6
6

Neither the exclusion of evidence nor the denial of a continuance, the errors
claimed on appeal, affected the establishment of a threat. Rather, any testimony that
20

Defendant testified that she was surprised when Hender grabbed a knife from
the dish drainer and held it to Honorio. When she asked Hender what he was
doing, he went "like that" with the knife, and said, "You go find the rest of his drug
money and stereos and whatever." R. 360:43. On cross examination, she said that
he told her to "shut up and go find the rest of the dope and the money." Id. at 60.
She testified that she was surprised to find that Myers too was involved, but did not
testify that he ordered her to do anything, let alone threatened her. Id. at 58.7
During cross examination about the incident, defendant was asked whether
Hender had threatened her with harm if she didn't go back to the bedroom to find
drugs and money. She said, "He didn't have to. I knew not to mess around just by
instinct." Id. at 60. When asked whether she had heard Hender or Myers threaten
Honorio and Norma with their lives if they didn't comply, defendant answered, "No,
I didn't." Id. at 61.
Defendant did not testify of any threat to her or to the victims that coerced her
participation. She did testify to a possibly menacing knife gesture and to Hender's

might have been adduced had the evidence been admitted and had the continuance been
granted, would—at most—have supported defendant's claims that she did not plan to
participate and that her failure to resist was reasonable.
7

Defendant did not address the apparent inconsistency arising from her testimony
that she, not Hender, invited Myers to accompany her to Honorio's home. R. 360:39.
She stated, "I took Greg with me basically because I don't—I like Greg more than I did
John." Id. She did not explain the fortuity of her invitation to the very person with
whom Hender had planned the crime.
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ordering her to find drugs, money, and stereos in the bedroom. She did testify to
her fear of Hender and Myers. But she did not testify to any threat that unlawful
physical force would be immediately used against her or against Honorio or Norma
if she did not comply. No other evidence or testimony at trial established or even
hinted at such a threat.
Having failed to establish the "specific detail of [an] alleged threat[]"
communicated to her, defendant's compulsion defense fails as a matter of law.
Harding, 635 P.2d at 35.
2.

Defendant cannot claim compulsion because she intentionally placed
herself in a situation where it was probable that she would be subjected
to duress.
Further, defendant is not entitled to a compulsion defense because she

"place[d] [herself] in a situation in which it is probable that [she would] be
subjected to duress." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-302(2). Defendant testified that the
coercion occurred while she was facilitating drug sales, a criminal activity. See
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 58-37-8 (1999) (prohibiting "arrange[ment] to distribute a

controlled or counterfeit substance").
Defendant also testified to Hender's volatileness and to her awareness of that
trait. Defendant testified that Hender was a regular drug user. R. 360:38, 56. She
said that he would "boss [her] around." Id. at 40. When asked to leave her home,
Hender would refuse and say, "What are you going to do about it?" Id. She
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described him as "overbearing," "boisterous," and "aggressive." Id. at 57. She
stated that the three elderly gentlemen with whom she lived were afraid of him and
that one of them wanted to testify that "[Hender] was going to shoot at him once."
Id. at 39-40.
Drug trading activities are fraught with the potential for violence and
irrational behavior, including betrayal and compulsion of one-time cohorts. By her
own admission, defendant was sufficiently acquainted with Hender to know his
tendencies to aggression and violence and intimidation. Assuming defendant and
Hender went to Honorio's home to establish a drug conduit, as defendant alleges,
defendant thereby placed herself in a situation where it was probable that she would
be subjected to duress. She is therefore not entitled to a compulsion defense.
3.

Even had defendant been coerced into taking money, taking the gold
jewelry was an independent, uncoerced criminal act, precluding
establishment of a compulsion defense.
Under Utah law, a compulsion defense is not available where a defendant is

coerced to commit one criminal activity, but "depart[s] from the coercion" and
commits a different criminal activity "of her own choosing." Farrell v. Turner, 482
P.2d 117, 120 (Utah 1971) (compulsion defense unavailable where inmate told
defendant "to break into jail, get the keys, and unlock the door," but defendant
instead gave the inmate hacksaw blades so that he could break out).
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Here, defendant testified that Hender "wanted to get dope and money."
R. 360:65. She admitted that neither Hender nor Myers knew of the valuable
jewelry in Norma's room. Id. When asked why she took the jewelry in addition to
the money, defendant said, "I figured that was more impressive. . . . And I seen this
and that would be the ticket to get this man out of the house." Id.
Defendant thus "departed from the coercion" and engaged in an independent
uncoerced act. Under the facts that she presented—the only facts that might have
demonstrated compulsion—defendant cannot establish her defense.
4.

Because defendant has not presented a reasonable basis to support her
compulsion claim, her claims of error are necessarily harmless.
Viewing all the evidence presented or that might have been presented in a

light most favorable to defendant, defendant cannot, as a matter of law, establish
legal compulsion. Defendant's claimed errors are therefore harmless. Had
defendant been allowed to elicit excluded testimony, the additional testimony would
not have established a legal basis for a compulsion defense.
B.

Defendant has waived any claims that evidence was improperly excluded
as hearsay and has not demonstrated an exception to the hearsay rules.
Defendant claims that the excluded evidence should have been admitted

because it fell outside the rule 801(c) hearsay definition. Br. Aplt. at 17-22. She
argues that the testimony would not have been hearsay because it was
•

not offered for the truth of the matter asserted and
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•

offered by the declarant.

Id. at 22. Defendant did not object on these grounds to the evidentiary rulings
below and does not argue plain error or exceptional circumstances. She has
therefore waived any claim on these grounds.
Defendant argued below that the testimony was admissible under rule 405,
Utah Rules of Evidence. The trial court properly ruled that it was not.
In any event, exclusion of the evidence was harmless. Other testimony
adduced sufficiently informed the jury that Hender and Myers were dangerous and
that defendant had reason to fear them.
1.

Defendant has not preserved her claim.
Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously excluded evidence of

Hender's and Myer's violent characters and criminal histories, evidence she sought
to admit to establish her compulsion defense. Br. Aplt. at 14. Defendant argues
that the testimony was admissible pursuant to rule 405(b), Utah Rules of Evidence,
cited as authority below. Id.; R. 360:28. She cites no authority for the application
of rule 405(b) in this context, but does cite authority relying on rules 404(b) and
801(c). Defendant affirmatively waived reliance on rule 404 below. R. 360:28.
Further, defendant did not argue the application of rule 801 below. "'Trial counsel
must state clearly and specifically all grounds for objection.'" State v. Bryant, 965
P.2d 539, 546 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1363
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n.12 (Utah 1993)). Indeed, "[t]he objection must "'be specific enough to give the
trial court notice of the very error' of which counsel complains.'" Bryant, 965 P.2d
at 546 (quoting Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co,, 912 P.2d 457, 460 (Utah
App. 1996) (citation omitted)). Finally, because defendant has argued no exception
to the preservation rule, her claim that the testimony was admissible under rules 404
and 801 is waived. See State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995);
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 941 nn.8-9 (Utah 1994); State v. Johnson, 114 P.2d
1141, 1144-1145 (Utah 1989).
2.

The trial court did not err when it excluded character and bad acts
testimony proffered as admissible under rule 405.
Defendant argues that the trial court improperly excluded testimony of

Hender's and Myers's criminal history that should have been admitted under rule
405, Utah Rules of Evidence. The trial court did not err.
Rule 405 provides:
(a) In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of character of a
person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to the reputation or
by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry is
allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct.
(b) In cases in which character or a trait of character of a person is [an]
essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may also be made of
specific instances of that person's conduct.
Rule 405 does not "deal with the admissibility of character evidence, which is
covered in Rule 404"; it "deals only with allowable methods of proving character."
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Advisory Committee Notes, Fed. R. Evid. 405. In other words, rule 405 does not
provide grounds for the admission of evidence otherwise excludable, e.g., under
hearsay or relevance grounds. See Utah R. Evid. 801, 402.
Further, even if Rule 405(b) were read as a rule governing admissibility where
the character of a person is an essential element of the crime, defendant could not
prevail. Defendant apparently argues that Hender's and Myers's violent characters
constitute an essential element of her compulsion defense. They do not. The
compulsion defense requires a showing of coercion based on use or threatened
imminent use of unlawful physical force. The character of the persons making the
threat, violent or peaceable, is not an element of the defense. See United States v.
Swanson, 9 F.3d 1354, 1359 (1993) (no authority "requires that a defendant who
claims coercion as a defense prove that the person who conducted the coercion had
a violent character").
Defendant argues specifically that the trial court erred when it excluded
Eaton's answer to the question, "Was there anything about John or Greg that you
told [defendant] about?" Br. Aplt. at 22; R. 360:32-33. Defendant argues that the
response should have been admitted because it fell outside the definition of hearsay
found in rule 801(c): "'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted." Defendant argues that the testimony was offered, not
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for proof that Hender and Myers actually committed the acts to which Eaton might
have testified, but to show that defendant had reason to fear them. Br. Aplt. at 22.
As explained above, defendant did not make this argument below. She did
not assert below that the testimony was being offered for this purpose. The judge
therefore properly viewed the testimony as hearsay and excluded it.
Defendant also raises for the first time on appeal her claim that Eaton's
response would not be hearsay by definition because Eaton was the declarant. Br.
Aplt. at 22. Defendant cites Utah R. Evid. 801(c), emphasizing a portion of the
rule: '"Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted." Br. Aplt. at 22. Defendant fails to observe that Eaton did not make the
excluded statement "while testifying at trial or hearing," as required by the rule.
In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded testimony
about Hender's and Myers's criminal histories and characters. The evidence
defendant sought to admit was not an essential element of her defense. In any case,
the trial court ruled that it was not, as required, otherwise admissible, because it was
hearsay. Defendant did not assert below that the testimony was outside the
definition of hearsay and cannot now claim error on that ground.
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C.

Error, if any, was harmless.
If error occurred, it was harmless. In light of the overwhelming evidence

against defendant, a result more favorable to defendant, absent the error, is not
reasonably likely. "An erroneous decision to admit or exclude evidence . . . cannot
result in reversible error unless the error is harmful." State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d
232, 240 (Utah 1992). An error is harmful only where, "absent the error there is a
reasonable likelihood of an outcome more favorable to the defendant." State v.
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1221 (Utah 1993). In evaluating whether an error is harmful,
the reviewing court must consider the importance of the challenged testimony in
light of the overall strength of the State's case. See id.
First, defendant was not, as a matter of law, entitled to a compulsion defense.
Testimony regarding her co-perpetrators' dangerous characters would not have
changed that.
Second, the jury was sufficiently informed of the dangerousness of
defendant's co-perpetrators by testimony that was admitted. Defendant testified that
Hender was a regular drug user. R. 360:38, 56. She said that he would "boss [her]
around" and that when she would ask him to leave her home he would refuse and
say, "What are you going to do about it?" Id. at 39. She described him as
"overbearing," "boisterous," and "aggressive." Id. at 57. She stated that the three
elderly gentlemen with whom she lived were afraid of him and that one of them
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wanted to testify that "[Hender] was going to shoot at him once." Id. at 39-40. She
maintained throughout her testimony that fear of Hender compelled her criminal
activity.
William Jay Eaton, defendant's former boyfriend, also testified that defendant
was intimidated by Hender. R. 360:35. In addition, defense counsel elicited
testimony from Detective Nudd that Hender, who at the time of trial was under
investigation for participation in this offense, was already incarcerated at the Utah
State Prison. Id. at 174-175.
The testimony presented was sufficient to inform the jury that Hender was
dangerous. Further evidence of his or Myer's violent character or criminal history
would have been merely cumulative.
Third, the State's case was overwhelming. Defendant was found in
possession of a large amount of cash—some in her pocket and some stuffed down
her pants, a new car purchased that day, and stolen jewelry taken from the victims.
R. 358:158, 160-161; 360:17-19. When asked about the jewelry, she lied to police,
saying the rings belonged to her children. R. 360:15. She said her son's name was
Jacob, but changed the name to Hajacob and then Hobo when she learned that one
of the rings had an "H" on it. Id. She lied about the watch, saying it belonged to
her fiance. R. 360:68-69. She told one of the police officers that the money she
had was her "tax money," but testified later that it was "truck money" or "travel
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money." R. 360:15, 48, 72. She said nothing of coercion to the investigating
officers. Further, by her own admission, defendant alone knew the victims.
R. 360:38-40. By her own admission, she came to the crime scene prepared—with
duct tape in her purse. R. 360:64.
Defendant's version of the crime, by contrast, was filled with inconsistencies
and wholly incredible. For example, defendant testified that
•

Hender and Myers had planned the burglary/robbery without her knowledge
(but she stated that she, not Hender, invited Myers to come along on the visit
to Honorio's home),

•

she completely emptied her purse in the motel room (but she acknowledged
that she possessed various stolen rings, a man's watch, a new car, and $1000
cash when arrested later in the day),
she had no duct tape in her purse at the time of the robbery (but she later
testified that the tape may have been in her purse because she had been
packing),

•

she knew nothing about the planned crime (but her duct tape testimony
demonstrated that she was prepared).

R. 360:39, 40, 47, 58, 64, 68, 69. No reasonable likelihood exists that the result in
this case would have been different absent the alleged errors. The challenged
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testimony was of minimal importance in light of the State's overwhelming case.
Exclusion of the evidence was harmless.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A CONTINUANCE
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her
motion for a continuance to locate her witness, Terry Pierce, who had been barred
from entering the courthouse. Br. Aplt. at 25-26. Pierce allegedly would have
testified that
•

Honorio and Norma were drug dealers,

•

he and defendant had purchased drugs from them for about a year,

•

he and defendant were planning to leave town,

•

he and defendant had sold his truck for about a thousand dollars and got
together some other cash,

•

he and defendant were going to introduce Hender and Myers to Honorio so
that Hender and Myers could purchase drugs directly,

•

he and defendant had purchased drugs from Honorio the evening before the
robbery,

•

he was arrested later that evening and so was not involved in the robbery
incident the following morning,

•

he knew of no plan to rob Honorio and Norma,
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•

he had a conversation with Hender where Hender bragged about how
defendant had not known about the "situation," had been stupid, and had been
the one arrested,

•

Hender was an imposing individual and defendant was intimidated by him.

R. 363:5-6.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion. Defendant has not demonstrated
that Pierce could actually have been produced within the continuance requested.
Further, under the facts of this case, any error was non-prejudicial. Pierce
would not have testified to an imminent threat. Further, his testimony would have
had no favorable bearing on whether defendant placed herself in a situation where
duress was probable or whether she departed from the compulsion. Even if the
excluded testimony may have supported the reasonableness of defendant's failure to
resist any alleged coercion, it would not, as a matter of law, have entitled defendant
to a compulsion defense. Error in excluding the evidence, if any, was necessarily
harmless.
A.

Defendant has not shown that her witness could actually have been
produced within the continuance requested or that he could have been
produced within a reasonable time.
A defendant moving for a continuance to procure the testimony of an absent

witness "must show that the testimony sought is material and admissible, that the
witness could actually be produced, that the witness could be produced within a
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reasonable time, and that due diligence has been exercised before the request for a
continuance." State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982). Further, on
appeal she must show that she was "materially prejudiced by the court's denial of
the continuance or that the trial result would have been different had the
continuance been granted." State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah App. 1991).
Here, defendant request a two-hour recess to find Pierce who had appeared at
the courthouse so intoxicated that he could barely walk. R. 325-326. Court security
officer Cisneros informed the court that Pierce could not even get through the
magnetometer. R. 363:9.
Defendant has not shown that Pierce could actually have been produced
within the time requested. Had defendant successfully located him, it is unlikely,
given his inebriation, that defendant would have called him or that he could have
meaningfully and appropriately responded to questioning. Further, as the trial judge
concluded, given "Mr. Pierce's propensities, one could not assume that he would
show up on any subsequent occasion in any condition to testify any more so than he
was the first time around." R. 363:11.
B.

Defendant has not shown prejudice.
Defendant has not shown that she was prejudiced by the denial of the

continuance. First, defendant would probably not have called Pierce in his obvious
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state of intoxication. Second, no reasonable likelihood exists that Pierce's testimony
would have changed the result.
Most of the matters to which Pierce allegedly would have testified would have
been irrelevant and/or inadmissible. Whether the victims were drugs dealers is
irrelevant. Whether Pierce knew of a plan to rob the victims is also irrelevant (and
would likely be offered only to invite speculation that if Pierce did not know, then
defendant would not have known).
Further, the trial judge would probably have excluded Pierce's testimony that
defendant was intimidated by Hender. The trial judge excluded similar testimony by
other witnesses.
Of the matters to which Pierce may have testified, those most central to
defendant's defense would have been (1) an alleged conversation where Hender had
bragged about how defendant had not known about the "situation," been stupid, and
got herself arrested, and (2) the alleged sale of his truck for $1000. See R. 363:5-6.
Defendant does not explain how Hender's statement against interest would
have been admissible under rule 804(3), Utah Rules of Evidence, which makes
inadmissible "[a] statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and
offered to exculpate the accused . . . unless corroborating circumstances clearly
indicate the trustworthiness of the statement." Further, she does not acknowledge
that Pierce's testimony that he sold his truck for $1000 and got together some
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additional sum would inadequately explain her possession of $1612 to $1762 cash
on the day of the crime—$392 (found in the search incident to her arrest), $620
(found later at the jail), and $600 to $750 paid out for the vehicle she purchased on
the day of the crime prior to her arrest. See R. 359:158, 160-161; R. 360:12, 17-19.
In any event, case law requires review of the denial of a continuance in
context of the case in its entirety. Here, Pierce's testimony would not have
established compulsion. Further, no reasonable likelihood exists that his testimony
would have changed the result. Defendant's story was inherently incredible and the
evidence presented against her was overwhelming. Nothing suggests that the jury
would have believed Pierce, any more than it believed defendant. See Seel v. Van
der Veur, 971 P.2d 924, 927 (Utah 1998) (no indication, in context of incredible
case, that jury would have found alibi witness more believable than defendant).
Assuming the court erred in denying the continuance, error was harmless. See id.
(when reviewing denial of continuance, court must take into account "the
overwhelming weight of the evidence against [a defendant] and the general
incredibility of [her] story").
Defendant has demonstrated neither an abuse or discretion nor prejudice based
on the trial court's denial of her motion for a continuance.
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CONCLUSION
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s \ 5 _ day of ^^Jtkt^L^
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Addendum A

295

UTAH CRIMINAL CODE

(2) The conduct constituting the offense is authorized,
solicited, requested, commanded, or undertaken, performed, or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or
by a high managerial agent acting within the scope of his
employment and in behalf of the corporation or association
1973

76-2-205. Criminal responsibility of person for conduct in name of corporation or association.
A person is criminally liable for conduct constituting an
offense which he performs or causes to be performed in the
name of or on behalf of a corporation or association to the same
extent as if such conduct were performed in his own name or
behalf
1973

PART 3
DEFENSES TO CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
76-2-301. Person under fourteen years old not criminally responsible.
A person is not criminally responsible for conduct performed
before he reaches the age of fourteen years This section shall
in no way limit the jurisdiction of or proceedings before the
juvenile courts of this state.
1973
76-2-302. Compulsion.
( D A person is not guilty of an offense when he engaged in
the proscribed conduct because he was coerced to do so by the
use or threatened imminent use of unlawful physical force
upon him or a third person, which force or threatened force a
person of reasonable firmness in his situation would not have
resisted.
(2) The defense of compulsion provided by this section shall
be unavailable to a person who intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly places himself in a situation in which it is probable
that he will be subjected to duress.
(3) A married woman is not entitled, by reason of the
presence of her husband, to any presumption of compulsion or
to any defense of compulsion except as in Subsection (1)
provided.

ISTS

76-2-303. Entrapment.
(1) It is a defense that the actor was entrapped into committing the offense Entrapment occurs when a peace officer or
a person directed by or acting in cooperation with the officer
induces the commission of an offense in order to obtain
evidence of the commission for prosecution by methods creating a substantial n s k that the offense would be committed by
one not otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to commit an offense does not
constitute entrapment.
(2) The defense of entrapment shall be unavailable when
causing or threatening bodily injury is an element of the
offense charged and the prosecution is based on conduct
causing or threatening the injury to a person other than the
person perpetrating the entrapment.
(3) The defense provided by this section is available even
though the actor denies commission of the conduct charged to
constitute the offense.
(4) Upon written motion of the defendant, the court shall
hear evidence on the issue and shall determine as a matter of
fact and law whether the defendant was entrapped to commit
the offense. Defendant's motion shall be made at least ten
days before trial except the court for good cause shown may
permit a later filing.
(5) Should the court determine that the defendant was
entrapped, it shall dismiss the case with prejudice, but if the
court determines the defendant was not entrapped, such issue

76-2-305

may be presented by the defendant to the jury at trial \ n v
order by the court dismissing a case based on entrapment
shall be appealable by the state
(6) In any h e a n n g before a judge or jury where the defense
of entrapment is an issue, past offenses of the defendant shall
not be admitted except that in a trial where the defendant
testifies he may be asked of his past convictions for felonies
and any testimony given by the defendant at a heanng on
entrapment may be used to impeach his testimony at trial
76-2-304. Ignorance or mistake of fact o r law.
(1) Unless otherwise provided, ignorance or mistake of fact
which disproves the culpable mental state is a defense to any
prosecution for that crime
(2) Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or meaning of a penal law is no defense to a crime unless
(a) Due to his ignorance or mistake, the actor reasonably believed his conduct did not constitute an offense
and
(b) His ignorance or mistake resulted from the actor s
reasonable reliance upon
(1) An official statement of the law contained in a
written order or grant of permission by an administrative agency charged by law with responsibility for
interpreting the law in question, or
(u) A written interpretation of the law contained in
an opinion of a court of record or made by a public
servant charged by law with responsibility for interpreting the law in question
(3) Although an actor's ignorance or mistake of fact or law
may constitute a defense to the offense charged, he may
nevertheless be convicted of a lesser included offense of which
he would be guilty if the fact or law were as he believed
1974
76-2-304.5. Mistake as to victim's age not a d e f e n s e .
(1) It is not a defense to the cnme of child kidnaping, a
violation of Section 76-5-301 1, rape of a child, a violation of
Section 76-5-402.1, object rape of a child, a violation of Section
76-5-402.3, sodomy upon a child, a violation of Section 76-5403 1, or sexual abuse of a child, a violation of Section
76-5-404 1, or aggravated sexual abuse of a child, a violation of
Subsection 76-5-404 1(3), or an attempt to commit any of those
offenses, that the actor mistakenly believed the victim to be 14
years of age or older at the time of the alleged offense or was
unaware of the victim's true age.
(2) It is not a defense to the cnme of unlawful sexual
activity with a minor, a violation of Section 76-5-401, sexual
abuse of a minor, a violation of Section 76-5-401 1, or an
attempt to commit either of these offenses, that the actor
mistakenly believed the victim to be 16 years of age or older at
the time of the alleged offense or was unaware of the victim s
true age
1999

76-2-305. Mental illness — Use as a defense — Influence of alcohol or other substance voluntarily
consumed — Definition.
(1) (a) It is a defense to a prosecution under any statute or
ordinance that the defendant, as a result of mental
illness, lacked the mental state required as an element of
the offense charged.
(b) Mental illness is not otherwise a defense, but may
be evidence m mitigation of the penalty in a capital felony
under Section 76-3-207 and may be evidence of special
mitigation reducing the level of a criminal homicide or
attempted criminal homicide offense under Section 76-5205 5.

(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait
of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the
victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the
same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefUlness of the victim offered by
the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the
first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided
in Rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident. In other words, evidence offered under this
rule is admissible if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and meets the
requirements of Rules 402 and 403.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; February 11, 1998.)
Advisory Committee Note. — Provision*
of this rule apply to character evidence to prove
conduct, aa distinguished from proof of character where character is an essential element of a
charge, claim or defense. As to the latter, see
Rule 405(b). See also Advisory Committee Note
to Rule 404, Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule
47, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) was comparable. See also State v. Day, 572 P.2d 703 (Utah
1977) (character evidence as to the character of
the victim of a homicide was admissible to

rebut the defendant's contention that the deceased was the aggressor). One significant difference between this rule and Rule 47, Utah
Rules of Evidence (1971) is that there is no
provision for the use of character evidence in
civil cases, except where character is the ultimate issue in question, whereas Rule 47 authorized the use of character evidence in cml cases
not only on the ultimate issue but where otherwise substantively relevant See Boyce, Character Evidence: The Substantive Use, 4 Utah

trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as
to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination
inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct.
(b) Specific instances of conduct In cases in which character or a trait of
character of a person is essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof
may also be made of specific instances of that person's conduct.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim, and is consistent
with Rule 46, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971)
and the decisions of the Utah Supreme Court.
Cf. State v. Howard, 544 P 2d 466 (Utah 1975).

Rule 47, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971^ appears
to be covered by subdivisions taXl) or ib; of
Rule 404.
Croat-References. — Slander, truth as defense, § 76-9-508.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Character trait in issue.
Specific instances of conduct.
Testimony as to reputation.
Victim's reputation.
Cited.
Character trait in issue.
Defendant's general reputation for honesty
and veracity are not in issue on a charge of
sexual abuse. State v. Sisneros, 561 P.2d 1339
(Utah 1978).
Since evidence of character is not an essential element of sexual abuse of a child, proof
cannot be made under Subdivision (b); proof
must be made under Subdivision (a) by testimony as to reputation or in the form of an
opinion. State v. Lenaburg, 781 P.2d 432 (Utah
1989).
Specific instances of conduct.
Since a defendant's character is not an element of the crime of sexual abuse of a child, a
court does not err in denying the request by a
defendant charged with such crime for admission of past instances of conduct relating to his
"reputation for sexual morality.'' State v. Miller,
709 P.2d 360 (Utah 1986).

Testimony as to reputation.
The accepted procedure in eliciting testimony
of one's reputation as it pertains to his character or a trait of his character that is in issue u
to first qualify the witness by determining if he
is acquainted with the reputation of the persox
in question, and if so, then to have him relat*
what that reputation is. State v Goodliffe, 571
P2d 1288 (Utah 1978).
Witness' individual opinion is inadmissible a
evidence of person's reputation. State <
Goodlifle, 578 R2d 1288 (Utah 1978)
Victim's reputation.
In rape prosecution, where evidence she*
that the association between the parties can
about in a sociable and peaceable manner and
transition to violence is claimed, there is
genuine and critical issue as to consent so th
the probative value of the victim's reputation
to moral character outweighs the negative fa
tors and justifies admission of evidence as
her reputation. State v. Howard, 544 P2d 4<
(Utah 1975).
Cited in State v. Speer, 750 P2d 186 (Ut
1988); State v. Alonzo, 932 P2d 606 (Utah (
App. 1997), afiTd, 973 P2d 975 (Utah 1998).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah LAW Review. — Rape Victim Confrontation — 1986, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 3, 687.
Note, Enhancing Penalties by Admitting

"Bad Character" Evidence During the G\
Phase of Criminal Trials — State v. Bish
1989 Utah L. Rev. 1013.

Rule 801. Definitions.
The following definitions apply under this article(a) Statement A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2)
nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the oerson £ E ^ £ „ .
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" i3 a person who makes a statement.
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the deciara
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth
the matter asserted.
°^
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if:
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or heart*
and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the sta^
ment is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony or the witness demo.
having made the statement or has forgotten, or (B) consistent with th
declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied char*!
against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, o
(C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving the person; or
(2) Admission by party-opponent The statement is offered against a pa^
and is (A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or a represent^
tive capacity, or (B) a statement of which the party has manifested an adoption
or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by the party to
make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the party's
agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or
employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement
by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the
conspiracy.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Advisory Committee Note. — Subsection
(a) is in accord with Rule 62(1), Utah Rules of
Evidence (1971).
Subsection (b) is in accord with Rule 62(2),
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). The hearsay
rule is not applicable in declarations of devices
and machines, e.g., radar. The definition of
"hearsay" in subdivision (c) is substantially the
same as Rule 63, Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971).
Subdivision (dXl) is similar to Rule 63(1),
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). It deviates from
the federal rule in that it allows use of prior
statements as substantive evidence if (1) inconsistent or (2) the witness has forgotten, and
does not require the prior statement to have
been given under oath or subject to perjury. The
former Utah rules admitted such statements as
an exception to the hearsay rule. See California
v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), with respect to
confrontation problems under the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Subdivision (dXl) is as originally promulgated
by the United States Supreme Court with the
addition of the language "or the witness denies
having made the statement or has forgotten"
and is in keeping with the prior Utah rule and
the actual effect on most juries.
Subdivision (dXIXB) is in substance the
same as Rule 63(1), Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971). The Utah court has been liberal in its
interpretation of the applicable rule in this
general area. State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198,310
P.2d 388 (1957).
Subdivision (dXIXC) comports with prior
Utah case law. State v. Owens, 15 Utah 2d 123,
388 P.2d 797 (1964); State v. Vasquez, 22 Utah
2d 277, 451 R2d 786 (1969).
The substance of subdivision (dX2XA) was
contained in Rules 63(6) and (7), Utah Rules of
Evidence (1971), as an exception to the hearsay
rule.

Similar provisions to subdivisions (dX2XB)
and (C) were contained in Rule 63(8), Utah
Rules of Evidence (1971), as an exception to the
hearsay rule.
Rule 63(9), Utah Rules of Evidence (I97i)t
was of similar substance and scope to subdivil
sion (dX2XD), except that Rule 63(9) required
that the declarant be unavailable before such
admissions are received. Adoptive and vicarious admissions have been recognized as admissible in criminal as well as civil cases. State v
Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1980).
Statements by a coconspirator of a party
made during the course and in furtherance of
the conspiracy, admissible as non-hearsay under subdivision (dX2XE), have traditionally
been admitted as exceptions to' the hearsay
rule. State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365,120 P 2d 285
(1941). Rule 63(9Xb), Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971), was broader than this rule in that it
provided for the admission of statements made
while the party and declarant were participating in a plan to commit a cnme or a cml wrong
if the statement was relevant to the plan or its
subject matter and made while the plan was in
existence and before its complete execution or
other termination.
Cross-References. — Affidavits admissible
in hearing on motion, U R.C.R 43(b).
Affidavits, taking and certification of, § 7826-5 et seq.
Contemporaneous entries and writings of decedent as prima facie evidence, § 78-25-8.
Depositions and discovery, U R.C.P. 26 et seq.
Judgment, entry of, U.R.C.P. 58A.
Judgment roll in criminal case, contents and
filing, U.R.Cnm.P. 22.
Marriage certificate, issuance and &li£&
§§ 30-1-6, 30-1-12.
Official records as evidence, § 78-25-3.
U.R.C.P. 44.

